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The hearsay objection is usually raised when an in-court witness
testifies to statements made by an out-of-court declarant. Nonethe-
less, some authorities include testimony by an in-court witness con-
cerning the conduct or silence of an out-of-court individual in the
category of inadmissible hearsay. These authorities exclude conduct
and silence even if it is nonassertive and, thus, not intended to con-
vey a message.
In courts that exclude conduct and silence as hearsay, a hearsay
objection would be sustained if, for example, an in-court witness tes-
tified that no complaints were received from other buyers, if that
testimony was being used to prove that goods purchased by a plain-
tiff-buyer were not defective.' Testimony excluded in this manner is
often referred to as "negative hearsay."2 Although cases supporting
this objection exist, many practitioners overlook the possibility of
maintaining a hearsay objection to testimony concerning silence.3
The classification of a witness' testimony as hearsay, if it relates
the silence of others to the court, is based on the assumption that
evidence of silence is as untrustworthy as more conventional forms
of hearsay, and must, consequently, be withheld from the jury. This
comment examines the soundness of subjecting evidence of silence to
the proscription of the hearsay rule by analyzing the theoretical basis
of the rule prohibiting admission of hearsay and reviewing appropri-
1. See generally James K. Thompson Co. v. International Compositions Co., 191 App.
Div. 553, 181 N.Y.S. 637 (1st Dept. 1920) (plaintiffs evidence of absence of complaints from
subsequent purchaser held hearsay and inadmissible to show conforming nature of goods sold
to first buyer); Altrug v. William Whitman Co., 185 App. Div. 744, 173 N.Y.S. 669 (1st Dept.
1919) (silence of subsequent purchaser of goods held hearsay). See also Hadden v. Gateway
West Pub. Co., 130 Colo. 73, 273 P.2d 733 (1954) (testimony that no other complaints were
filed held incompetent hearsay); Hinson v. Morgan, 225 N.C. 740, 36 S.E.2d 266 (1945) (testi-
mony of husband that he never heard wife mention paying or being paid for land held hearsay
in an action to recover title to land); Minor v. Narragansett Mach. Co., 71 R.I. 108, 42 A.2d
711 (1945) (testimony that plaintiff did not mention employment contract held hearsay and
inadmissible to show absence of contract); Smith v. Korn Indus. Inc., - S.C. -, 262 S.E.2d 27
(1980) (testimony of friend that he had never heard plaintiff complain of urinary problems
before the occurrence of an automobile accident is negative hearsay and inadmissible to show
condition did not exist).
2. 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 193(h) (1964).
3. Falknor, Silence as Hearsay, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 192 (1940).
ate case law. The special problems arising from testimony concern-
ing silence are discussed and compared with the dangers
encountered when verbal hearsay is introduced as evidence.
II. The Hearsay Rule
The probative value of hearsay evidence rests on the credibility
of the out-of-court declarant.4 The hearsay rule prohibits the use of
a person's assertions, as the equivalent of testimony of the fact as-
serted therein, unless the declarant is brought into court5 or the dec-
laration testified to fits into one of the rule's many exceptions.
6
When a witness who is not the declarant testifies to the statements
made by an out-of-court declarant, he acts as a mere conduit
through whom the impressions of another are conveyed to the
court.7 The untrustworthy nature of such evidence is the basis for
the hearsay rule, which is grounded in the theory that many possible
deficiencies, suppressions, and sources of error may be best brought
to light and exposed by cross-examination8 with the witness present
in court and under oath.9
A. Historical Background
Legal scholars of the eighteenth century offered three reasons
for excluding hearsay evidence from the courtroom. First, the jury
and the court should base their findings on what a witness knows as
a result of personal observation, rather than on what he has been
told by another.'" Second, the witness must make his knowledge
available when he is in court and under oath, which exposes him to
the sanctions of the court."I Last, the opposing party is entitled to
4. Pasquale Food Co. v. L & H Int'l Airmotive, Inc., 51 Ala. App. 127, 283 So. 2d 438
(1973).
5. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
6. The breadth of exceptions to the modem hearsay rule prompted one writer to de-
clare, "[A]ny rule, I submit, requiring thirty-two exceptions to explain its operation is not a
rule at all . . .." Smith, The Hearsay Rule and the Dockett Crisis.- The Futile Search For
Paradise, 54 A.B.A.J. 231, 235 (1968).
7. J. APPELTON, EVIDENCE 174 (1860).
8. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1362, at 3. For an excellent discussion of the relationship
between the hearsay rule and cross examination, see id at §§ 1367-1397.
9. Strahorn, A Reconsideration of The Hearsay Rule andAdmissions, 85 U. PA. L. REV.
484, 484 (1937).
10. The modem practice is to allow the jury to consider hearsay that has been entered
into evidence without objection. See Stafford v. Roadway Transit Co., 73 F. Supp. 458 (W.D.
Pa. 1947). Such evidence may be considered by the trier of fact on the theory that the adver-
sary, by failing to object, has waived his right to have the evidence excluded. See also Black,
Hearsay 4dmitted Without Objection - A Defense of Its Probative Value, 17 S. TEX. L. REV. 69
(1975). Thus, this historic justification for the hearsay rule has been slighted by modem courts.
i1. See WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1363, at 10. Jurists believed that the oath placed the
witness in the precarious position of either telling the truth or incurring the wrath of supernat-
ural forces. Wigmore states that the oath is merely a customary feature accompanying cross-
examination and believes it to be merely incidental.
the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.' 2 These criteria pro-
tect the jury from evidence of questionable credibility. The latter
two devices are still employed by the courts as a means of protecting
the jury from untrustworthy evidence.
B. Modern Hearsay Theory
1. Protecting the Trier of Fact.-It is generally agreed that
cross-examination is the most effective means of assuring the accu-
racy and sincerity of testimony. '3 The possibility of untruthful testi-
mony is the major reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence.'
4
Through cross-examination, failures of perception, memory, and
narration can also be revealed.' 5
The personal appearance of a witness provides the trier of fact
with an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness and to
consider that demeanor when evaluating the credibility of the wit-
ness. The requirement of personal appearance is central in hearsay
theory since particular danger exists in permitting a witness to repeat
spoken words.'6
2. The Four Dangers of Hearsay. -There are four criteria by
which the credibility of testimony is judged: (1) sincerity - is the
person telling the truth?; (2) narration - is his language such that it
conveys accurately the testifier's belief?; (3) memory - has the testi-
fier retained an accurate impression of what occurred?; (4) percep-
tion - did the person describing the event observe it correctly?"'
All testimony that relies on inference as a means of proof'8 ex-
poses the jury to possible inaccuracies in one or more of the danger
areas mentioned above. The distinction between inadmissible hear-
say and other testimony lies in the inaccessibility of the out-of-court
declarant to those tests that might expose weaknesses in his sincerity,
narration, memory, or perception. Consideration of the inferential
12. These three historical justifications for the hearsay rule are further developed in Mor-
gan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 182-
83 (1948).
13. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 245, at 583 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). See also Morgan,
Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1138 (1935).
14. Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 HARV. L. REV. 146, 148 (1912). See
also Finman, ImpliedAssertions as Hearsay. Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
14 STA. L. REV. 682 (1962). Finman contends that cross-examination is unlikely to expose
deliberate, rehearsed, falsification. Id. at 690.
15. See note 17 and accompanying text infra.
16. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 245 at 582. See also FED. R. EvID. 801. Comment (a)
to rule 801 explains that personal appearance also gives the opponent valuable clues. The
value of oath as a safeguard is discounted by the advisory committee.
17. Morgan, supra note 13; Seligman, supra note 14, at 147. See also MCCORMICK, supra
note 13, § 245, at 581. McCormick recognizes only three danger areas and asserts that sincerity
is only an aspect of the others.
18. The sole method of proof not involving inference is discussed below. See note 19
and accompanying text infra.
process that occurs when a witness presents testimony highlights the
importance of subjecting testimony to such examination.
3. Inferences from Evidence.-Dean Wigmore describes two
methods of persuading the tribunal deciding a contested proposition.
The first is to produce the thing itself. 9 Jury views of land, the pro-
duction of movables, and the examination of documents are exam-
ples of this method of persuasion. The second entails the
presentation of some fact from which an inference can be drawn.2"
Aside from the first type of persuasion, all evidence involves an in-
ference from some fact to the proposition to be proved.
21
When testimony is offered into evidence, the chain of inference
is drawn from the utterance of the witness to his belief in the fact
stated in the utterance, and from the belief of the witness to the exist-
ence of the fact believed. 22 When the trier of fact draws the infer-
ence from the utterance of the witness to the witness' belief, the trier
may be misled by inaccurate narration or insincerity on the part of
the witness. In drawing the further inference from the belief of the
witness to the fact believed, the trier of fact encounters the possibility
of being misled by the failing memory or faulty perception of the
witness.23
19. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 24 (3d ed. 1940).
20. Id
21. Id § 25, at 398.
22. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958 (1974). The discussion in
the text relates to direct evidence. See Jennings v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Ass'n., 260 Iowa 279, 149
N.W.2d 298 (1967). Thus, in a prosecution for arson, testimony by a witness that he saw the
defendant apply the torch that caused the fire is direct evidence. I B. JONES, EVIDENCE § 1.3
(6th ed. S. Gard 1972). The line of inference is from the utterance of the witness that he saw
the defendant apply the torch to the belief of the witness in that fact, and from that belief to
the fact that the defendant did start the fire.
If another inference is drawn from the fact inferred through the process described in the
preceding paragraph, then the evidence is circumstantial. McGrady v. Quality Motors of El-
kin Inc., 23 N.C. App. 256, 208 S.E.2d 911 (1974). Thus, in a murder case in which the perpe-
trator's identity is unknown, testimony by a witness that he saw Xrunning away from the area
is direct evidence of the fact, but is circumstantial evidence that Xcommitted the crime. See
McCormick, supra note 13, § 185. The evidence is circumstantial because one is required to
infer from the fact that X was running that X committed the crime.
23. Tribe, supra note 22, at 959. The arrangement of the possible danger areas in relation
to the inferences drawn from an utterance is logical since it is the narration and sincerity of the
witness that are relied on by the trier of fact when making the first inference, and the witness'
memory and perception upon which the trier relies when making the second inference. If, in
making an inference from an utterance to the belief of the witness, one must base his inference
on an utterance that is not believed by the witness, or that is not communicated in a manner
that tells the listener the true belief of the witness, then a faulty inference will occur. McCor-
mick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489, 490 (1936). This results because the infer-
ence will not yield the belief of the witness. Similarly, if one makes an inference based on an
utterance that is the product of an erroneous memory or faulty perception, an incorrect infer-
ence will be drawn from the belief of the witness to the fact believed. Id at 490.
The reader should note that the crucial inferences, those involving the possible danger
points, take place before any further inference from the fact believed to some other fact.
Therefore, the dangers of hearsay are identical whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial
in nature.
If a witness testifies in court that he has personal knowledge of a
fact or occurrence, those danger areas that are responsible for incor-
rect inferences and, thus, faulty conclusions can be exposed through
the mechanism of cross-examination. The lack of opportunity to
subject the out-of-court declarant to those tests that expose inaccu-
racy is why hearsay is considered untrustworthy.24
C. Evaluating Testimony - A Matter of Perspective
If a witness testifies, for example, in a slander action, the witness
is the sole source of untrustworthy testimony. Since the only pur-
pose of allowing a witness to testify about a statement by an out-of-
court declarant in such a situation is to prove whether or not the
slanderous statement was made, and not whether it is true, it is the
credibility of the witness' testimony that requires examination. The
trustworthiness of the out-of-court declarant who made the slander-
ous comment is not involved. No problem exists because the witness
is in court and his testimony is subject to the rigors of cross-examina-
tion and additional safeguards of testimonial veracity.25
If testimony that constitutes verbal hearsay is given by a wit-
ness, the emphasis of the inquiry is not solely on the testimony of the
witness, who is a mere conduit, but also on the statements of the out-
of-court declarant. 26 The statements of the out-of-court declarant
are the basis for the inference drawn by the trier of fact. Conse-
quently, it is the credibility of the out-of-court declarant and his
statements that must be scrutinized if the testimony of the witness is
to be considered trustworthy. Because this is impossible, the evi-
dence is excluded as untrustworthy27 unless it falls within an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule.
Testimony by a witness that no complaints or reports were
made to him lies between the two spheres described in the proceed-
ing paragraphs. 28 Therefore, it is not surprising that authorities dif-
fer when considering the nature of testimony of silence. Some
authorities support the propriety of emphasizing the testimony of the
witness, as in a defamation action.29 If this position is adopted, no
inquiry into the untrustworthiness of silence evidence is necessary
24. Finman, supra note 14; Tribe, supra note 22, at 958.
25. See notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra.
26. Of course-the credibility of the testimony of a witness is always at issue. The dangers
of sincerity, narration, memory, and perception are present in the testimony of any witness.
The reason for excluding the testimony of the witness in a hearsay situation, however, is not
based on the dangers presented by the in-court witness. Rather, exclusion is necessitated by
the untrustworthy nature of the statement of the out-of-court declarant.
27. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
28. See notes 69-80 and accompanying text infra.
29. See, e.g., People v. Layman, 117 Cal. App. 476, 4 P.2d 244 (1931); Murray v. Ameri-
can Builder's Supply, Inc., 472 P.2d 738 (Colo. App. 1970); Commonwealth v. Johnson, No.
2816 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1979) (mem).
since the only possibility of untrustworthiness is perceived as ema-
nating from the witness. Other authorities assert that testimony of
silence is similar to a witness testifying about a statement by an out-
of-court declarant and either exclude the testimony as inadmissible
hearsay,3" or admit it as an exception to the hearsay rule when vari-
ous criteria are met.
3'
Before turning to the specific theories and problems encoun-
tered when a hearsay objection is made to a witness' testimony of
silence, it is instructive to consider the concepts involved in the ad-
mission of testimony of conduct by a witness who observed such
conduct. Nonassertive conduct is similar to nonassertive silence
since neither is intended to convey a message.3 2 A verbal hearsay
statement contains an express assertion and, therefore, evinces the
intent of the out-of-court declarant to communicate.33
III. Conduct as Hearsay
A. When is Conduct Hearsay?
Many instances exist when conduct can clearly be categorized as
hearsay. When a witness testifies that he saw someone point at a
list,3 4 or at a suspect in a line up,35 or that he saw someone nod his
head,3 6 the witness is relating information that is intended by the
out-of-court individual to be a communicative assertion. In these
situations all of the dangers that are present if verbal hearsay is ad-
mitted into evidence are active and cause the testimony to be un-
trustworthy.37 The conduct described above is obviously assertive in
nature.
Nonassertive conduct is not intended to communicate. To
prove that it was raining, a witness may testify that, upon looking
out his window, he saw people walking about with their umbrellas
opened.38 Similarly, a witness might assert that he observed a sea
captain board a ship with his entire family after inspecting the vessel
30. See, e.g., Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark. v. Home, 256 Ark. 647, 510 S.W.2d 70
(1974); Smith v. Korn Indus. Inc., - S.C. -, 262 S.E.2d 27 (1980); George W. Saunders Live-
stock Comm'n v. Kincaid, 168 S.W. 977 (Tex. Ct. App. 1914).
31. See Falknor, supra note 3.
32. Finman, supra note 14, at 685.
33. Id.
34. United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1963).
35. This hypothetical is discussed in FED. R. EVID. 801, comment (a).
36. This hypothetical is discussed in 4 WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE 801-46 (1977).
37. 2 B. JONES, EVIDENCE § 268 at 518 (5th ed. S. Gard 1958). When testimony concerns
assertive conduct the jury draws inferences from the conduct of the out-of-court actor. Since
the actor intends his action as a substitute for verbal assertion as great an opportunity for
faulty inference exists as in the case of verbal hearsay. See Finman, supra note 14, at 684.
38. Falknor, The "'Hear-Say" Rule as a "See-Do" Rule. Evidence of Conduct, 33 ROCKY
MTN. L. REV. 133, 133 (1960). Falknor poses the question, "[Wlould her testimony as to what
she saw those people do be equated to what she would have heard them say, had she called
out, asked them whether it was raining, and they had replied that it was?" Id at 133.
in an attempt to prove that the ship was sound.3 9 It has been argued
that the testimony of the witness looking out the window, or of the
observer of the sea captain, gives rise to an implied assertion4" by the
out-of-court actor. From this implied assertion, an inference is
drawn to the belief of the actor and from the belief a further infer-
ence is made to the fact believed.4' Thus, nonassertive conduct is
considered by some authorities to be the basis for implied assertions,
which can be distinguished from express assertions because the for-
mer lack communicative intent.42
Because a difference exists between assertive and nonassertive
conduct, 4 3 the question arises whether the two types of conduct
should be distinguished when the hearsay determination is made.
The proper resolution of this question depends upon a comparison
of the dangers involved when either type of conduct is admitted into
evidence.
B. Conduct Considered as Evidence
1. Implied Assertion vs. Express Assertion-Is There a Dier-
ence?-It is recognized that nonassertive conduct is sufficiently relia-
ble to permit the admission of testimony concerning such conduct
into evidence. 44 When the action was not intended to communicate,
little chance exists that the act was done to deceive, 45 and the ab-
sence of the danger of insincerity46 militates against sustaining a
hearsay objection.47
The problem attendant to admitting testimony of a third party's
nonassertive conduct is the difficulty of determining whether the
39. This hypothetical is discussed in McCormick, supra note 23, at 490. See also, Clary
v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969) (when information in car oper-
ation manual was offered in evidence, court declared only assertive conduct is hearsay); People
v. Clark, 6 Cal. App. 3d 658, 86 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1970) (testimony that wife fainted when asked
if husband owned type of coat worn by murder suspect held not hearsay); Cantrell v.
Cafoureck, 513 S.W.2d 690 (Mo. App. 1974) (testimony that wife was seen signing promissory
note offered to prove execution held nonhearsay).
40. See MCCORMICK supra note 13, § 250 at 598. McCormick states that the characteri-
zation of such conduct as an implied assertion prejudges the issue since it implies conscious
thought and, therefore, intent to communicate.
41. Finman, supra note 14, at 684. Thus, in the case of the people walking with their
umbrellas open, the conduct is interpreted as an assertion that it is raining.
42. Id at 685.
43. See notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra.
44. FED. R. EVID. 801; Maguire, The Hearsay System.- Around and Through the Thicket,
14 VAND. L. REV. 741 (1960). Maguire suggests that the objecting party carry the burden of
proving that such behavior was intended as an assertion. Id. at 766. This seems reasonable
since situations in which reasonable controversy over the nature of the conduct arises are gen-
erally cases that concern truly nonassertive conduct.
45. Seligman, supra note 14, at 148.
46. Falknor, supra note 38, at 137.
47. See E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 250 (1962), wherein Morgan ex-
plains as follows: "[T]he accepted justification for most of the recognized exceptions to the
hearsay rule [is] on the ground that the circumstances of the utterance furnish a guaranty of
sincerity."
conduct is assertive or nonassertive. The suggested standard is one
of apparent intent.48 Intent to communicate exists when a reason-
able person in the position of the actor at the time and place under
consideration would intend his conduct to be communicative.49 A
subjective standard, based on the actual intent of the actor, seems
unworkable since the primary source of establishing that intent, the
testimony of the actor, is unavailable." Because the actual intent of
the actor cannot be ascertained, there exists a possibility of deception
inherent in conduct.
Although the dangers emanating from the possibility of insin-
cerity are substantially avoided when evidence of nonassertive con-
duct is presented in court, the dangers created when inferences are
based on inaccurate memory or faulty perception remain." The
confusion generated by improper narration also exists, although it is
subdued. 2 It has been suggested that evidence of conduct, although
hearsay, should be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule
when the event or condition sought to be proved by the nonassertive
conduct of the actor was within the actor's knowledge and the con-
duct was detrimental to the actor." Indeed, some recent statutes
take nonassertive conduct out of the definition of hearsay. 4 The
48. Seligman, supra note 14, at 148. Some conduct is clearly nonassertive. See People v.
Clark, 6 Cal. App. 3d 658, 86 Cal. Rpt. 106 (1970) (testimony that wife fainted when asked if
husband owned type of coat worn by murder suspect held not hearsay); Bagwell & Stewart,
Inc. v. Bennett, 214 Ga. 780, 107 S.E.2d 824 (1959) (testimony by witness that family members
vomited held not hearsay in an action to enjoin operation of a rendering plant); Morgan v.
Mull, 101 Ga. App. 36, 112 S.E.2d 661 (1960) (testimony by wife of expression of pain on
husband's face not subject to hearsay objection). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 250
at 596.
49. Comment, Abolish the Rule Against Hearsay, 35 U. PiTr. L. REV. 609, 612 (1974). See
also Seligman, supra note 14, at 148-49 n.6.
50. Comment, supra note 49, at 612.
5 1. In drawing an inference from the implied assertion of the actor to his belief in some
fact, one must rely on the actor's narration and sincerity. Since these dangers are slight, there
is little possibility of an inaccurate inference. In making an inference from the belief of the
actor to the fact believed the dangers of memory and perception are substantial.
Maguire suggests that the possible problem posed by the perception danger might be
avoided by requiring a judicial finding, embodied in pre-trial proceedings, that the individual
whose behavior is being offered had an adequate opportunity for personal observation of the
matters that the behavior tends to establish as having occurred or existed. Maguire, supra note
44, at 764.
52. Falknor, supra note 3, at 201; Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WASH. L. REv. 1, 7-8
(1937). Morgan states that the narration danger present in such a situation, based on the possi-
bility of misunderstanding the meaning of the conduct, is no greater than in the case of any
circumstantial evidence. Id.
53. Morgan, supra note 13, at 1159. The requirement of detrimental conduct is included
to safeguard the sincerity of the conduct. Finman suggests that a requirement that the conduct
concerned be important to the actor may ensure that the actor has utilized his powers of per-
ception fully. Thus, the conduct of the sea captain, highly important to the actor, is less likely
to involve the possibility of inaccurate inference caused by inaccurate perception. Finman,
supra note 14, at 692.
54. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801; CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 225, 1200 (West 1966). Rule 801 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence provides as follows:
The following definitions apply under this article: (a) Statement. A "statement" is (I)
an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by
concept of nonassertive conduct as nonhearsay is not universally ac-
cepted. 5 Such conduct is frequently considered hearsay not subject
to exception under the hearsay rule.1
6
The similarity between nonassertive conduct and nonassertive
silence resides in the absence of communicative intent in either the
former or the latter.57 Testimony by a witness that no complaints or
reports were made to him has often been held inadmissible as hear-
say if used to show the absence of a fact or condition, regardless of
the assertive or nonassertive character of the silence.58 As in the case
of nonassertive conduct, the proper categorization of testimony of
nonassertive silence remains unsettled.
IV. Silence as Hearsay, Silence as Fact
A. Excluding Silence
A court may find that "negative hearsay" is present if a witness
testifies that no reports or complaints were made to him. On such
occasions, silence evidence is construed by those who consider it to
be hearsay as lack of assertion59 from which inferences can be
drawn, first, to the belief of the silent individual, and second, from
that belief to the fact believed.
For example, if X complained that he and his companion street-
car riders were thrown violently to the floor of the car when an acci-
dent occurred and that he was injured thereby, testimony offered by
the streetcar company that no other complaints were made is open to
a hearsay objection.6" In discussing this case Dean Morgan writes:
Now obviously the line of inference here involved is from lack of
assertion of claim by any other passenger to his belief that he had
no claim, from such belief to the fact that he had no claim, from
such fact to the fact that he received no injury, and from lack of
him as an assertion ..... (c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.
The advisory committee notes to 801 explain that while such evidence of non-assertive conduct
is untested with respect to perception, memory, and narration these dangers are minimal and
do not justify exclusion of such evidence on hearsay grounds.
55. See State v. Wilson, 4 Ariz. App. 420, 420 P.2d 992 (1966); Tribe, supra note 22, at
972.
56. See cases cited in MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 250 at 598 n.42.
57. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
58. Such evidence is generally held not to be objectionable as hearsay if it is offered to
show absence of notice. See, e.g., St. Gregory's Church v. O'Conner, 13 Ariz. App. 421, 477
P.2d 540 (1970); Matthews v. Jean's Pastry Shop, Inc., 113 N.H. 546, 311 A.2d 127 (1973).
Testimony concerning silence, if used to show lack of notice, is similar to testimony of the
statement of an out-of-court declarant in a slander action. In either case the only purpose of
the evidence is to show whether or not a statement was made.
59. "Lack of assertion" must be distinguished from the term "nonassertive." "Nonasser-
tive" conduct or silence is conduct or silence that is not intended to convey a message. "Lack of
assertion," in this instance, is merely descriptive of the fact that when silence is offered into
evidence there is no positive activity involved.
60. See Sullivan v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 161 Minn. 45, 200 N.W. 922 (1924).
injury to the fact that he had not fallen.6'
Described in this manner, the theoretical similarities between
conduct and silence are evident.62 Since verbal assertions, nonasser-
tive conduct, and nonassertive silence all entail a similar arrange-
ment of individuals, it is easy to understand why the latter two might
be equated to the former and labeled hearsay. Analysis of the si-
lence problem, however, cannot be solved by placing individuals in
an evidentiary schematic. Instead, it requires examination of the
dangers present when evidence of silence is admitted at trial.
63
In Aenard v. Cashman,'4 plaintiff sought compensation for inju-
ries allegedly inflicted when he fell down defendant's stairs. Plaintiff
claimed that some defect in the stairs caused his fall. The stairwell
was connected to a shop rented to the witnesses by defendant. Testi-
mony by one of the lessees that she had not received complaints
from other customers concerning defects in the stairs was excluded
as hearsay, subject to exception taken by defendant's counsel. On
appeal it was determined that,
the probative effect of the excluded evidence would rest in the im-
plication that because patrons did not complain of any defects to
the tenant, they thereby indicated that they encountered none and
therefore there were none. Coming from a witness having no per-
sonal knowledge of what such users did find, the testimony would
have the characteristics of hearsay.
65
Further, the court stated that if the testimony were not hearsay, it
would be, at most, inconclusive silence.66
The line of inference developed by the court in the Cashman
case is similar to that presented by Dean Morgan.67 It appears, how-
ever, that the Cashman court based its decision more on the place-
ment of the individuals and the similarity of that arrangement to a
conventional verbal hearsay situation than on true contemplation of
61. Morgan, supra note 52, at 10.
62. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.
63. See Morgan, supra note 13, at 1148-49. Morgan states as follows:
[Wihether a failure to make a claim of personal injury in an alleged accident or to
make a complaint of defects of quality in goods delivered was intended to operate as
an assertion of no injury by the potential claimant or of satisfactory quality by the
potential complainant may be properly subject to dispute and investigation. But
when the fact is revealed, the problem of admissibility is not solved; it has merely
been rendered capable of clearer statement. If the [silence] was intended to serve as
an assertion, testimony describing it primafacie carries all the dangers of hearsay; if
not so intended, it carries only part of them. In either event the real problem is
whether these dangers are sufficient to render its reception inexpedient.
64. 94 N.H. 428, 55 A.2d 156 (1947).
65. Id at 434, 55 A.2d at 160-61.
66. Id
67. See note 61 and accompanying text supra. Morgan draws his first inference from lack
of assertion to the belief of the silent individual. The Cashman court treats lack of assertion as
an implied assertion when it states, "they indicated that they encountered none." From that
implied assertion the Cashman court draws an inference to the "fact asserted," but an infer-
ence from the implied assertion to the belief of the silent individual, and then to the fact
believed, is implicit in the decision enunciated in Cashman.
the dangers encountered when nonassertive silence is entered into
evidence. Testimony concerning nonassertive silence does not have
"the characteristics of hearsay." 68 The dangers inherent in admis-
sion of verbal hearsay into evidence are distinct from those present
when a witness testifies about nonassertive silence.
B. Nonassertive Silence-The Dangers Involved
L Sincerity and Narration. -Neither sincerity nor narration
create any difficulty when testimony of nonassertive silence is
presented in court. It is safe to assume that people refrain from
making complaints or reports because they lack cause or sufficient
motivation to take such action, not because they wish to assert that
they did not encounter a certain condition. In Cashman, the court
treats nonassertive silence as an implied assertion, but fails to recog-
nize the crucial distinction between an implied and an express asser-
tion. Since an implied assertion is made with no intent to
communicate, it cannot create an inaccurate inference due to insin-
cere testimony.7" The danger of incorrect inference attributable to
improper narration, which is only slightly present when nonassertive
conduct is testified to by a witness,7' is even less substantial when
testimony of nonassertive silence is presented at trial.72 Nonetheless,
narration may be problematical to the extent that the thing to be
proved by silence is insufficient to motivate an individual to com-
plain or report.
2 Memory and Perception.-It is more difficult to discount the
possibility that the trier of fact may be misled by the failing memory
or faulty perception of the silent individual whose silence is the sub-
ject of a witness' testimony. It has been stated that since "[t]here can
be no interval of time between . . . silence and the negative fact
which it is offered to prove, '73 no opportunity exists for failure of
memory. Naturally, the problem remains that one may forget an
68. Menard v. Cashman, 94 N.H. 428, 434, 55 A.2d 156, 160-61 (1947). The Cashman
court is not alone in considering evidence of silence as inadmissible hearsay. For decisions
similar to Cashman, see cases cited at note I supra and note 90 infra.
69. Falknor, supra note 3, at 201; Finman, supra note 14, at 685.
70. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
71. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
72. See 24 N.C. L. REV. 274, 282 (1946), wherein the author contends that narration
problems are totally absent when evidence of silence is presented at trial.
Similar to nonassertive conduct, one may mistake the meaning of silence, and in that
sense a narration problem exists. See note 52 and accompanying text supra. Nevertheless,
inaction is less likely to cause a narration problem than is positive action. If a person sits down
on a chair and suddenly jumps up, it could not be shown with assurance whether he sat on a
tack, encountered a splinter, or was stung by a bee. If the person sat still, it would be clear that
none of these things took place. Therefore, if one desires to prove that the person did not
encounter one of the above mentioned hazards, his inaction is persuasive of that fact. No
narration problem would exist.
73. See 24 N.C. L. REV. 274, 282 (1946).
incident that actually occurred. The memory problem is not persua-
sive because people generally complain when reasons for complaint
arise and, therefore, have little time to forget the grounds for their
complaint.74 If a witness testifying in court repeats the statement of
an out-of-court declarant, the witness may convey to the court im-
pressions of the declarant that are based on events the declarant per-
ceived months earlier, and thus the memory danger is substantial.
This danger is much less significant when a witness testifies about
nonassertive silence.75
The possibility of inaccurate inference caused by faulty percep-
tion remains problematical.76 As in the area of nonassertive con-
duct, the situation itself often protects the jury from the possibility of
being misled by inaccurate perception.77
The narration and perception problems arising in silence cases
can be eliminated by relevance considerations.78 Testimony by a
witness that he received no complaints or reports has no relevance
when it can be shown that the silent individuals had no opportunity
to perceive the occurrence or event in question. As the likelihood of
accurate perception becomes greater, silence evidence increases in
weight.79 Eventually the likelihood of perception is great enough
that the testimony of silence becomes relevant evidence, assuming no
other factor detracts from its probative force.8" Similarly, the
74. The danger of failure of memory is also reduced if the alleged occurrence or fact
directly involved the silent individual. See note 94 and accompanying text infra.
75. The distinction between the danger of inaccurate memory present in testimony of
nonassertive conduct, as opposed to nonassertive silence, is slight but identifiable. The differ-
ence lies in the possibility that conduct might take place at any time subsequent to the event or
fact stimulating the conduct while silence is continuous.
76. Tbe magnitude of this danger can be decreased by adoption of Maguire's suggested
method of dealing with perception dangers attendant to nonassertive conduct. Maguire sug-
gests a pretrial determination that the out-of-court individual had adequate opportunity to
perceive. See Maguire, supra note 44, at 764. The perception problem existing in this situa-
tion is no greater than that injected into the judicial process when business records are used to
prove the nonoccurrence of an event. Admission of business records to prove nonoccurrence
of an event is permitted. See, e.g., Lindheimer v. United Fruit Co., 418 F.2d 606 (2d Cir.
1969); United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969).
77. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
78. In many cases testimony concerning silence is objected to only on relevance grounds.
In those cases silence is often held relevant evidence. See Cain v. George, 411 F.2d 572 (5th
Cir. 1969) (absence of complaints by guests that had previously stayed in a room in defend-
ant's hotel is relevant to show that gas killing decedent came from burning chair, not defective
gas heater); Rathburn v. Humphrey Co., 94 Ohio App. 429, 113 N.E.2d 877 (1953) (testimony
that no other complaints of alleged defective condition held relevant to show no accidents, and
had probative value on the issue of defective design); Ward v. Melby, 82 S.D. 132, 142 N.W.2d
526 (1966) (testimony by neighbors that they never heard decedent mention contract to make a
will favoring plaintiff, in exchange for lifetime care, held relevant negative testimony); Stark v.
Allis-Chalmers, 2 Wash. App. 399, 467 P.2d 854 (1970) (testimony by corporate officer that no
accidents were reported held relevant to show absence of condition subject of complaint). But
see Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. Ferguson, 271 Ala. 120, 122 So. 2d 356 (1960) (absence of
complaints is not relevant to show due care).
79. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Shupe, 131 Colo. 271, 280 P.2d 1115 (1955).
80. Of course this analysis presupposes that the silent individual has average perceptive
faculties. It does not provide for those who, for example, have less than average hearing or
probability that a condition to be proved would motivate an individ-
ual to complain can be evaluated from a relevance perspective.
Thus, the problem of narration is alleviated. Managing the possibil-
ity of faulty perception and improper narration of the silent individ-
ual as a question of relevance and weight substantially decreases the
danger of inaccurate inference. Because the dangers involved in per-
mitting nonassertive silence to be considered by the trier of fact are
significantly distinct from those occasioned by submission of verbal
hearsay, silence evidence is more properly judged under a relevance
standard.
C. Silence Admitted
1. Using the Relevance Standard to Decide the Admissibility
Question. -In St. Louis Southwestern Railway v. Arkansas & T Grain
Co.,8 1 plaintiff shipped corn with defendant carrier. The original
buyer rejected the corn, and defendant was forced to sell it, which
caused a loss to plaintiff. Defendant contended that the corn was
rotten when loaded and consequently disclaimed liability for plain-
tiff's loss. At trial, plaintiff presented testimony to prove that the
corn shipped by the defendant was part of a large shipment of corn
received and shipped as number two corn by plaintiff. Plaintifi's wit-
ness was permitted to testify, over objection, that the rest of the corn
was sold by plaintiff and that none of the other recipients of the corn
complained about its quality.
On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals decided that the
testimony of silence was not objectionable as hearsay, stating as fol-
lows:
Nor do we think it was hearsay. The witness merely stated a fact
within his own knowledge; that he did sell it in the course of trade
• . . not at retail but to retail dealers, and no complaint was ever
made. These are facts and not declarations of third persons.
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As explained previously, 3 the dangers inherent in verbal hear-
say are distinct from those present when testimony of nonassertive
silence is offered into evidence. This is recognized in the Southwest-
ern Railway case, in which the court declared testimony of the ab-
sence of complaints to be a fact and not hearsay. Once the
nonhearsay nature of nonassertive silence is recognized, the only
barrier to admission is one of relevance. The court's inquiry into the
nature of those who purchased the corn not shipped by the defend-
eyesight. This problem can be alleviated by weight considerations. Little weight may be given
to testimony that one person was in position to observe an event and did not report it. More
weight can be given to testimony that 100 individuals were situated in that manner and re-
mained silent.
81. 42 Tex. Civ. App. 125, 95 S.W. 656 (1906).
82. Id. at -, 95 S.W. at 660.
83. See notes 69-80 and accompanying text supra.
ant is obviously aimed at ascertaining the likelihood of perception
and motivation and, therefore, is a determination of relevance.84
The Southwestern Railway court treats testimony of silence in a
'manner similar to the traditional treatment given to a witness' testi-
mony in a slander action. The emphasis is on the witness and the
credibility of his testimony. The witness' narration, sincerity, mem-
ory, and perception are at issue. It is the inferences drawn from the
utterance of the witness that are probed for untrustworthiness.85 The
silence of the out-of-court individual is viewed as any other fact. 6
Because silence emanates from an individual, some dangers ex-
ist in admitting such testimony, but these are slight and distinct from
the substantial dangers involved in the admission of hearsay. Hence,
it is more reasonable to consider those dangers in the context of rele-
vance and weight to be afforded the evidence.
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Bowman v. Kauffman87 is similar to that of the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals in the Southwestern Railway case. In Bowman, plaintiff was
injured while defendant's car was being pushed into a garage for
repairs. One of plaintiffs fellow employees was steering the vehicle.
Plaintiff claimed the brakes in defendant's car failed, causing the car
to roll forward, striking and injuring plaintiff.
At trial, plaintiff's objection to testimony concerning silence was
sustained when defendant attempted to introduce the testimony of
the police officer who investigated the accident. On appeal, the Bow-
man court held that if the officer's testimony indicated that the
driver did not mention brake failure at the time of the investigation,
that testimony would show a relevant fact going to prove that the
brakes did not fail to operate. Although recognizing that some of the
dangers associated with hearsay are present in such circumstances, 8
84. See notes 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
85. See People v. Layman, 117 Cal. App. 476, 4 P.2d 244 (1931) (testimony of dispatcher
that no conductor reported an accident was admitted over hearsay objection and held direct
proof of the fact that no report was made and was therefore the basis for an inference that no
accident occurred). This is similar to the treatment given nonassertive conduct by some courts.
See United States v. Campbell, 466 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Blue, 432 F.2d
1191 (7th Cir. 1970); Yarbrough v. City of Warran, 383 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
86. See Jennings v. Walker, 206 So. 2d 729 (La. Ct. of App. 1968) (testimony of witness
that mother never mentioned payment for deed held admissible over hearsay objection); Com-
monwealth v. Johnson, No. 2816 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1979) (mem.) (in prosecution for
making false reports to law enforcement authorities, testimony that no reports were made re-
garding shooting in parking lot held to be fact and not hearsay); Latham v. Houston Land &
Trust Co., 62 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Ct. App. 1933) (testimony by family members that they never
heard supposed settlor mention alleged trust fund held not hearsay but fact).
87. 387 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1967).
88. Id at 588. See State v. Corn, 215 S.C. 166, 54 S.E.2d 559 (1949) (police officer's
testimony that, after firing several shots inside building, he was, upon investigation, unable to
find anyone in the neighborhood who heard shots, held hearsay). The Corn case is discussed
in State v. Sachs, 264 S.C. 541, 216 S.E.2d 501 (1975). The court in Sachs declared that the
officer's testimony in the Corn case had the effect of eliciting a response from each person
contacted. Id at 567, 216 S.E.2d at 515. The Sachs case adequately explains the distinction
the court found the evidence of silence sufficiently probative to jus-
tify its admission.
In Bowman, the line of inference is drawn from the testimony of
the officer to his belief that no complaint was made, and then to the
fact that no complaint was made. The absence of complaint is then
employed for a further inference that the brakes did not fail. This
sequence of inferences is clearly distinct from that delineated by the
Cashman court.89
In Cashman, testimony of silence is treated as an implied asser-
tion by the silent individuals. This reasoning explains in part why
the Cashman court found the testimony of silence to be hearsay. As
has been stated earlier, the arrangement of the individuals makes it
appear to be a hearsay situation. The dangers, however, are differ-
ent, and it is this difference that justifies the approach adopted by the
court in Bowman. The Bowman court, aware of the distinction be-
tween nonassertive silence and express assertions, emphasizes the
testimony of the witness, preferring to consider whatever remains of
the deflated dangers of hearsay in its contemplation of relevance.
In Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Home,9" plaintiff at-
tempted to show by evidence of silence that his boat was not stolen
until after a time when his insurance became effective. At trial, the
manager of the marina where plaintiff stored his boat testified that
the marina crew checked the boats docked at the marina twice daily,
that an inspection was made on the day in question, and that no
report of a missing boat was made to him. The court reasoned that
had the manager testified that his inspector reported that no boats
were missing a hearsay objection would have been proper, and
therefore, testimony that no report was made was also subject to a
hearsay objection.9'
In George W Saunders Livestock Commission Co. v. Kincaid,92
plaintiff returned 220 hogs purchased from defendant. Plaintiff
claimed the hogs were diseased. The defendant sought to present
testimony that a subsequent purchaser, Armour and Company,
made no complaint regarding the health of the hogs. The Texas
Court of Civil Appeals declared that it is impermissible to allow tes-
timony that a complaint was or was not made.93
between Corn and Bowman. In Corn, officers actively solicited responses from those inter-
viewed. It is likely that the community members answered negatively to questions posed by
the police, but the police officers framed their testimony in a manner that might avoid a hear-
say objection. It is possible that the community members remained silent in the face of ques-
tions, but this activity would be assertive silence. In either case testimony of such investigation
is hearsay. The silence in Bowman is not in response to inquiry by police.
89. See notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra.
90. 256 Ark. 647, 510 S.W.2d 70 (1974).
91. Id
92. 168 S.W. 977 (Tex. Ct. App. 1914).
93. Id at 978.
The superficial reasoning of the Home and Kincaid courts can-
not be justified. Like the Cashman court, the Home and Kincaid
courts fail to recognize the nature of nonassertive silence as trustwor-
thy evidence, more properly evaluated by relevance requirements.
The result reached by the Home court, if not the reasoning em-
ployed, can be supported by the analysis developed in the Southwest-
ern Railway and Bowman cases. A number of possible reasons exist
to explain absence of a report to the marina operator; the inspector
may have checked in a cursory manner or may not have inspected at
all. Thus, there is a great likelihood that he did not perceive whether
the boat was in the marina or not. Since the inspector had no per-
sonal interest in the result of the inspection or the making of reports,
the possibility of faulty perception and failing memory is increased.
Evidence of this type clearly has no probative value and can prop-
erly be excluded on relevance grounds.94
The reasoning of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Kincaid,
being similar to that indulged in by the Home court, is equally un-
tenable.95 The expertise of the Armour Company in judging animals
and the substantial outlay of funds concerned suppress possible dan-
gers of memory, narration, and perception. The evidence of silence,
clearly distinct from hearsay evidence, should have been entertained
as relevant.96
The decisions reached in the Southwestern Railway and Bow-
man cases do not stand alone. The proposition that testimony of
nonassertive silence may be considered relevant nonhearsay is sup-
ported by other courts, occasionally on the theory that such testi-
mony constitutes negative evidence.97
2. Negative Evidence-The General Theory -Testimony is
positive if it is composed of statements attesting to the fact that the
witness perceived a happening.98 Conversely, testimony is negative
if a witness states that he did not perceive an event.9 9 If a witness
94. Evidence is not relevant unless it makes the inference for which it is offered more
probable than other possible inferences. Bums, Weighing Circumstantial Evidence, 2 S. DAK.
L. REV. 36, 37 (1957). Similar analysis might support the decision made in Menard v. Cash-
man, 94 N.H. 428, 55 A.2d 156 (1947). Nevertheless, the Cashman court was on firmer ground
when it stated that the silence evidence offered to show the absence of defects in the stairs was
at most inconclusive silence. Id at 434, 55 A.2d at 160-61.
95. It is interesting to note that the Kincaid court does not mention the earlier case of St.
Louis S.W. Ry. v. Arkansas & T. Grain Co., 42 Tex. Civ. App. 125, 95 S.W. 656 (1906).
96. Possible support for the result reached in this case can be found in the habit of the
meat packing industry of the era to process diseased animals. See U. SINCLAR, THE JUNGLE
(8th ed. 1963). One might, therefore, expect that no complaints would come from Armour in
any event. This creates a narration problem sufficient to make the evidence fail the test of
relevance. See Morgan, supra note 52, at 7-8.
97. See, e.g., State v. Childers, 196 La. 554, 119 So. 640 (1941); Ward v. Melby, 82 S.D.
132, 142 N.W.2d 526 (1966).
98. 4 B. JONES, EVIDENCE § 29.4 (6th ed. S. Gard 1972).
99. Id It has been asserted that all evidence is positive and that no distinction exists
testifies that he did not see or did not hear something, such evidence
may be admitted to show that the thing did not occur.'00
There is no inherent weakness in negative evidence. It rests on
the perceptive senses that are the basis of positive evidence.' It is
essential that such evidence rest on perception. Testimony that one
does not remember 1 2 or know 0 3 is neither positive nor negative evi-
dence on the point."° A disavowal of knowledge is neither accepta-
ble as, nor a legitimate substitute for, negative evidence.1
0 5
A witness' testimony concerning the nonoccurrence of an event
is not relevant unless it is shown that he was situated in such a man-
ner that he would have noticed the event had it taken place. 0 6 Thus,
negative evidence is only admissible when the attendant circum-
stances give it probative force. 107
When a witness' testimony contains negative evidence, the focus
of the court is on the credibility of the witness and his testimony.'
0 8
When nonassertive silence is treated as negative evidence, silence is
equated with an unlighted headlight or unsounded bell, the silence
being the nonoccurring event that is the substance of the witness'
testimony.' 09
3. Silence as Negative Evidence. -In Murray v. American Build-
between evidence that a person did or did not observe an occurrence if the person was situated
in such a manner that he would have noticed had the occurrence taken place. See Black v.
Kansas City S. Ry., 436 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. 1968); Richards v. County of Schuylkill, 399 Pa. 552,
161 A.2d 27 (1960); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Bruce, 208 Va. 595, 159 S.E.2d 815 (1968).
The characterization of such evidence as positive or negative is more semantic than substan-
tive.
100. Riddick v. Jim Hay Co., 45 Cal. App. 3d 464, 119 Cal. Rpt. 546 (1975). See Doubeck
v. Greco, 7 Ariz. App. 102, 436 P.2d 494 (1968) (testimony of passenger in car that collided
with motor scooter that headlight on scooter was not illuminated); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Mc-
Daniel, 252 Ark. 586, 483 S.W.2d 569 (1972) (testimony of witness located near intersection of
railway and highway that he did not hear a train bell); Lindhartsen v. Myler, 91 Idaho 269, 420
P.2d 259 (1966) (testimony by witness that he saw no illuminated clearance lights on defend-
ant's truck); Larson v. Heintz Constr. Co., 219 Or. 25, 345 P.2d 835 (1959) (testimony by truck
driver that he did not hear plaintiffs horn as plaintiff attempted to pass).
101. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 664 (3d ed. 1940).
102. State v. Feld Chevrolet, 403 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. App. 1966).
103. De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313 (3d Cir. 1975).
104. State v. Feld Chevrolet, 403 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. App. 1966).
105. De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313 (3d Cir. 1975).
106. Lindhartsen v. Myler, 91 Idaho 269, 420 P.2d 259 (1966).
107. Colorado & S. Ry. Co. v. Honaker, 92 Colo. 239, 19 P.2d 759 (1933); Becherer v.
Best, 74 111. App. 2d 174, 219 N.E.2d 371 (1966). A person may testify to the fact that he was
situated in such a position that he would have known had the event occurred. See Tesney v.
State, 77 Ala. 33 (1884); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Ward, 252 Ark. 74, 477 S.W.2d 835 (1972).
It has been held that positive evidence must prevail over negative evidence. Sulpher
Springs Valley Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Verdugo, 14 Ariz. App. 141, 481 P.2d 511 (1971). The
better reasoned decisions hold negative evidence and positive evidence equal in probative
force and effect. Negative evidence can support a verdict although positive evidence to the
contrary exists. Riddick v. Jim Hay Co., 45 Cal. App. 3d 464, 119 Cal. Rpt. 546 (1975).
108. Lehr v. Gresham Berry Growers, 231 Or. 202, 372 P.2d 488 (1962).
109. See State v. Childers, 196 La. 554, 199 So. 640 (1941) (law clerk's testimony that
attorney never mentioned drawing will held not hearsay and, while negative in character, rele-
vant evidence and admissible to show forgery).
ers Supply Inc., " 0 plaintiff sued to recover salary allegedly owed
him by defendant corporation under an employment contract made
by the corporation's past president. The vice-president of the corpo-
ration testified that he attended all meetings of the board of directors
and never heard anyone mention the alleged contract. Plaintiff ob-
jected on the ground that the evidence constituted "negative hear-
say." The Colorado Court of Appeals declared such evidence to be
merely a statement of a negative fact and circumstantial evidence in
the case. "'
The Murray court distinguished the silence testimony received
in evidence from inadmissible hearsay by explaining that hearsay
derives its value, in part, from the veracity of someone other than the
witness." I2 Obviously, this court considers the witness as the sole
source of untrustworthy evidence. The court found no difficulty in
substituting a person's silence for an unsounded bell or horn," 1 3 sup-
porting its opinion by citing several negative evidence cases. "4
Silence is given similar treatment by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Silver v. New York Central Railroad."15 In
Silver, a passenger alleged that she was injured because of the tem-
perature encountered while travelling on one of the defendant's
trains. The porter assigned to the car on which the plaintiff had rid-
den was not permitted to testify that the eleven other passengers on
board the car had not complained that they were cold.
The Massachusetts court took note of the fact that evidence of
silence had been excluded as inadmissible hearsay in some cases, but
refused to consider such testimony hearsay, preferring to categorize
silence evidence as negative evidence. 16 The court declared that
substantial similarity between the experience of the eleven other pas-
sengers and the experience of the plaintiff must be established before
the porter's testimony would be admitted. The Silver court also em-
phasized that proof of the porter's location is an essential prerequi-
site to the admission of his testimony. It must be shown that he was
situated in such a manner that he would have been the person likely
110. 472 P.2d 738 (Colo. App. 1970).
Ill. Id at 739. The Colorado Court of Appeals stated,
This type of evidence should not be referred to as hearsay, which is defined as, "evi-
dence, whether oral or written, which derives its value, not solely from the credit to
be given to the witness upon the stand, but in part from the veracity and competency
of some other person. "... The questioned testimony is more properly classified as
circumstantial evidence.
This court has long approved the acceptance into evidence of statements of a
negative fact by witnesses who were in a position to have observed the circumstances.
Id
112. Id
113. See generally cases cited at note 100 supra.
114. 472 P.2d at 739-40.
115. 329 Mass. 14, 105 N.E.2d 923 (1952).
116. Id at 19-20, 105 N.E.2d at 926-27.
to receive complaints." 7
The requirement of substantial similarity of experience enunci-
ated in the Silver opinion clearly goes to the relevance decision."I8 If
it is shown that all of the other passengers encountered the same
conditions that the plaintiff encountered, then the possibility of inac-
curate inference caused by faulty perception" 9 is remote. 2 °
Both the Murray and Silver decisions emphasize the importance
of the witness being situated in such a manner that he would be
likely to perceive an occurrence if it takes place. 2 ' This is a tradi-
tional requirement in negative evidence cases.' 22 Inquiry into the
location of the witness in relation to the nonoccurrence has two func-
tions. First, it increases the likelihood that the witness would have
perceived the event had it occurred.' 2 3 Second, it assists in sup-
pressing any possibility of failing memory on the part of the silent
individual. 124
Whether testimony of nonassertive silence is considered to be
negative evidence or evidence of fact is unimportant.' 25 The only
advantage in categorizing evidence of nonassertive silence as nega-
tive evidence lies in the explicit provision for the location of the wit-
ness in the negative evidence formula. Nevertheless, this is a
requirement ultimately necessary to a finding of relevancy for evi-
dence of silence. 
26
V. Conclusion
The total exclusion of testimony concerning nonassertive silence
from the judicial process often deprives the trier of fact of reliable
evidence. This deprivation cannot be supported by a "negative hear-
say" theory. Classification of such testimony as hearsay is not based
on full consideration of the justifications for the hearsay rule. If
117. Id
118. Compare Siegel, King & Co. v. Penny & Baldwin, 176 Ark. 336, 2 S.W.2d 1082
(1928) (testimony that seller sold pipe to others who made no complaint held irrelevant since
pipe may not have been of same type and other purchasers may not have been given war-
ranty), with St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Arkansas & T. Grain Co., 42 Tex. Civ. App. 125, 95 S.W. 656
(1906) (testimony that no other purchasers complained of quality of corn sold as number two
corn held relevant nonhearsay).
119. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
120. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra.
121. Murray v. American Builder's Supply, Inc., 472 P.2d 738, 739 (Colo. App. 1970);
Silver v. New York Cent. R.R., 329 Mass. 14, 21, 105 N.E.2d 923, 927 (1952).
122. See notes 106-107 and accompanying text supra.
123. See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
124. This function is more apparent in Silper.
125. The distinction is unimportant if they are afforded equal weight. See note 107 and
accompanying text supra.
126. See Landfield v. Albiani Lunch Co., 268 Mass. 528, 168 N.E. 160 (1929) (testimony
that no other customers complained that they became ill is admissible if it appears that others
ate and had opportunity to complain).
those reasons are explored, it becomes apparent that testimony of
nonassertive silence is clearly distinct from hearsay testimony.
Accordingly, nonassertive silence is properly judged by a rele-
vance standard. Adoption of a relevance standard permits the trial
judge to determine whether the narration, memory, and perception
of the out-of-court individual detract from the probative value of the
evidence. In addition, the relevance determination requires the trial
judge to find that the witness was situated in such a manner that he
would have been likely to observe any breach of silence. These crite-
ria adequately insulate the trier of fact from the possibility of consid-
ering evidence that might cause inaccurate inferences.
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